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Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics: Debunking and Dispensability 
Edited by U. D. LEIBOWITZ and N. SINCLAIR 
Oxford University Press, 2016, x + 257 pp. $74.00 
David Faraci 
 
This volume covers two related debates in both metaethics and the philosophy of 
mathematics, with brief forays into the philosophies of logic and religion and the 
history of ethics. The first debate is about ‘evolutionary debunking arguments’ 
(EDAs)—roughly, arguments that because evolutionary pressures do not track 
realistically construed ethical and mathematical (EM) truths, the evolutionary origins 
of our EM-beliefs suggest that they do not track such truths. The second debate is 
about ‘indispensability arguments’ (IAs)—roughly, arguments that we are justified in 
including realistically construed EM-entities in our ontology because they are 
indispensable for some important project. 
The discussion of EDAs comprises six chapters. First, Justin Clarke-Doane 
(ch. 2) rehearses his (2012, 2014, 2015, 2016) argument that evolutionary debunkers 
cannot threaten our EM-beliefs without threatening their safety or sensitivity—i.e., 
without suggesting that they fail to track the truth across some relevant set of 
possible worlds—and that debunkers fail in this regard. Folke Tersman (ch. 3) 
responds that while it is in principle legitimate to assume the truth of our beliefs in 
responding to EDAs, there are limits on how such assumptions can be used which 
may threaten modal responses like Clarke-Doane’s. Toby Handfield (ch. 4) extends 
EDAs to question our beliefs about objective chances. Erik Wielenberg (ch. 5) 
challenges EDAs to beliefs in both ethics and religion. And Hallvard Lillehammer (ch. 
6) looks at things from a historical perspective, considering how contemporary EDAs 
compare to relevant arguments from Moore, Ross and Spencer. Discussion of EDAs 
closes with Richard Joyce (ch. 7), who replies to the previous chapters, generally 
defending the significance, though also pressing what he takes to be the modest 
aspirations, of EDAs.  
If you are familiar with this literature, you probably know Clarke-Doane’s 
argument and the sorts of things Joyce has said in defense of EDAs (belief pills, etc.). 
Tersman’s argument is more novel, as he attempts to find a middle ground in the 
current debate over the charge that assuming the truth of our beliefs in responding 
to EDAs is question-begging. Unfortunately, while the interim chapters add some 
helpful details, there isn’t much new here about the general force of EDAs. Handfield, 
like Joyce, argues that evolution hasn’t made our ethical beliefs as modally stable as 
safety requires. Wielenberg’s arguments against EDAs centrally rely on the same 
relationship between truth-tracking and modality as Clarke-Doane’s. And 
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Lillehammer’s discussion is fascinating, but for the most part of purely historical 
interest.  
I want to flag a related issue here, one I think especially important for readers 
less familiar with the relevant literature. (Karl Schafer 2017 flags a similar issue.) Until 
Joyce, none of the authors challenge the idea that we should understand truth-
tracking in terms of modal conditions (though Tersman does suggest that modal 
conditions should imply our beliefs’ actual truth). Clarke-Doane, Handfield and 
Wielenberg all simply accept this premise, or at least seem to think it plausible.  
This might seem to suggest that the EDA debate is primarily about whether 
our beliefs meet the right modal conditions, not about whether truth-tracking should 
be understood in modal terms in the first place. But this is misleading. Arguments for 
the safety and sensitivity of our EM-beliefs crucially depend on the necessity of EM-
truths. Yet many who defend modal conditions in epistemology take them to be 
relevant only for contingent truths, precisely because when it comes to necessary 
truths such conditions are “too easily trivialized” (Lewis 1986, 114). Robert Nozick, 
who introduced the sensitivity condition in his (1981), thought it improper to apply it 
to necessary truths. Duncan Pritchard (e.g., 2007), a prominent proponent of safety, 
is explicit that it is meant only for contingent truths, or might accommodate 
necessary truths only after adjustment to avoid triviality. And as just quoted, David 
Lewis, who is often (and ironically) taken to be the progenitor of modal responses to 
EDAs, likewise held that understanding truth-tracking in modal terms “does not 
make very good sense for knowledge of non-contingent matters” (Lewis 1986, 114). 
There are actually two debates in the volume’s second half: one about 
explanatory indispensability; the other about deliberative indispensability. Regarding 
explanatory IAs: Alexander Miller (ch. 8) argues that ethics’ being judgement-
dependent is consistent with ethical explanations of ethical beliefs, suggesting that 
such explanations cannot be used to vindicate the existence of judgement-
independent ethical entities. David Liggins (ch. 9) argues that explanations of 
empirical facts that appeal to EM-properties only require EM-predicates, undercutting 
their ontological aspirations. And from the other side of the aisle, Debbie Roberts (ch. 
10) argues that not only are there ethical explanations of empirical facts, but the 
explanantia are irreducibly ethical, suggesting that there is an explanatory IA not just 
for ethical realism, but for ethical non-naturalism. 
I found these chapters illuminating both individually and as counterpoints to 
one another, especially Liggins vs. Roberts. One intriguing thing they suggest, I think, 
is that whether ethics is explanatorily indispensable could depend on substantive 
ethical questions.  
To see why, note that a standard objection to explanatory IAs is that an 
explanation in terms of EM-properties can be replaced with an explanation in terms 
of the properties that subvene them. A standard response is that because EM-
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properties are multiply realizable, explanations in terms of their subvening properties 
will be less general and less illuminating.  
Roberts notes that a reductivist might rebut that there will be some 
commonality between the properties that subvene ethical properties, undercutting 
the multiple realizability response. But, she says, the reductivist is not entitled to this 
assumption; perhaps the only thing the subvening properties have in common is their 
subvenience. I think she’s right about this, but that she is likewise not entitled to 
assume the opposite. It is an open question whether the subvening properties share 
anything else in common—presumably, a question for normative ethics.  
The final three chapters concern David Enoch’s (2011) argument that ethics 
(or, more broadly, normativity) is indispensable for deliberation. Mary Leng (ch. 11) 
argues that Enoch’s IA may be objectionable because it employs normative premises, 
something that causes no concern for IAs in the philosophy of mathematics. Alan 
Baker (ch. 12) argues that given wide rejection of Quinean holism, what matters is 
not whether mathematics is indispensable for science, but whether the particular 
scientific mini-projects for which it is indispensable are (following Enoch) rationally 
non-optional. Intriguingly, since ethics is arguably indispensable for all deliberative 
mini-projects, IAs in metaethics might turn out to be on more solid ground than in 
the philosophy of mathematics. Finally, David Enoch (ch. 13) responds to both, 
arguing—successfully, in my view—that Leng’s concerns about normative premises 
are misguided, but expressing excitement about the fact that both Leng and Baker 
highlight potential strengths of his argument, even above explanatory IAs in 
mathematics. 
I found these chapters extremely illuminating regarding the nature of IAs, 
though I should admit that this may in part be due to my relative lack of familiarity 
with the IA literature. Indeed, while it makes perfect sense that the editors order 
things as they do, I might recommend that IA neophytes read these chapters before 
the prior three, as both Leng and Baker offer helpful overviews of IAs in the 
philosophy of mathematics.  
In their introduction, Leibowitz and Sinclair tell us that this volume is meant 
to exemplify what they call the “companions in illumination” approach; the goal is 
“illuminating and assessing ways of arguing in both” metaethics and the philosophy 
of mathematics (4). I’ve already said something about the degree to which I find these 
chapters illuminating, individually and en masse. How successful is the volume as a 
comparative exercise?  
I think the most successful discussion in this regard is the one about Enoch’s 
deliberative IA. The deliberative IA has no analogue in the philosophy of 
mathematics, where most IAs are explanatory. Enoch takes on the daunting task of 
saying why we are justified in inferring to the best explanation, and argues that this 
vindicates going in for deliberative indispensability. 
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Most criticism of Enoch’s argument has been at this level: attacking the 
epistemological moves Enoch makes here. I think that’s as it should be; that’s where 
the real action is when it comes to assessing the force of his argument. But it is 
extremely helpful to put Enoch’s argument in context and consider, as both Leng and 
Baker do, how his take on IAs and their place in the literature matches up with what’s 
going on in the philosophy of mathematics. (I should note that if I didn’t have the 
concerns I do about how they paint the dialectic, I’d likely say the same about several 
of the chapters on EDAs; those less suspicious of modal conditions can adjust 
accordingly.) 
By contrast, I worry that the comparative nature of the discussion of 
explanatory IAs made it less illuminating in certain respects. Consider again Liggins 
vs. Roberts. My impression is that in the philosophy of mathematics, few pursue the 
‘hard road’ of dispensing with mathematical language in their explanations. But the 
hard road in metaethics is much more popular (indeed, this is part of why Enoch 
developed the deliberative IA in the first place). Part of the explanation for this 
asymmetry, I suspect, is that in metaethics the subvening explanantia vs. multiple 
realizability debate can frequently be sidestepped, because the majority of purported 
ethical explanations are of facts about people’s behavior or mental states. (Both of 
Liggins’ examples are; three out of four of Roberts’ are, including the one she appeals 
to in her discussion of multiple realizability.) Notice that in such cases, we may not 
need to appeal to subvening properties as explanantia; we may merely need to appeal 
to people’s mental states—e.g., appeal to their ethical judgements to explain their 
behavior—arguably avoiding the former’s deficits in generality and illumination. Yet 
Roberts never discusses this possibility; she simply rejects the hard road on multiple 
realizability grounds. And perhaps because Liggins is focused on aspects of the 
dialectic that apply in both metaethics and the philosophy of mathematics he never 
mentions it either, so this gets lost in the fray. 
Perhaps the lesson here is that “companions in illumination” is easiest to pull 
off when we consider an argument from a novel perspective. More care is needed for 
discussion of an argument that has been independently pursued in multiple areas, as 
we run the risk of overestimating the similarities between them, ultimately producing 
something less illuminating than we would if we were to focus on the areas one at a 
time. 
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